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I.  INTRODUCTION
During the past three decades, regulatory agencies in the United
States and other countries of the Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD) went through a three stage
evolution in dealing with and managing environmental pollution, and
gradually discovered that working with the private sector to manage
industrial pollution can yield more beneficial results than traditional
command and control approaches.1  They started out with the tradi-
tional command and control approach which, if adequately enforced,
has the virtues of high dependability and predictability, but some-
times proves to be inflexible and inefficient.2  In the mid-1980s, envi-
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sity of California, Santa Barbara.  This paper builds on a research project accomplished at the
Bren School by Brad Edwards, Jill Gravender, Annette Killmer, Genia Schenke and Mel Willis
under the supervision of professors James Frew and Arturo Keller.  I thank them very much for
their essential input.  This paper benefited from the comments of David Vogel, Robert Kagan
and Diahanna Lynch at UC Berkeley.  I also thank Janet Kayfetz for her valuable contribution.
1. See Bill L. Long, Environmental Regulation: The Third Generation, THE OECD
OBSERVER, June-July 1997, at 14, 14-16.  See generally Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environ-
mental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command To Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 103, 105-112 (1998) (discussing EPA’s attempts to “reinvent” itself, culminating in the
promotion of various voluntary initiatives).
2. See Long, supra note 1, at 15.  On the shortcomings of command and control approach,
see, e.g., Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Integrative Regulation: A Principle-Based Ap-
proach To Environmental Policy, 24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 853, 861-862 (1999) (criticizing “inter-
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ronmental regulation entered its second generation emphasizing the
employment of market-based strategies and tools such as pollution
taxes, tradable permits, and deposit-refund systems.3  These instru-
ments were believed to improve both economic efficiency and envi-
ronmental effectiveness by relying on market incentives.4  Finally, in
the 1990s, environmental regulation entered its third generation
placing great emphasis on voluntary environmental initiatives.5  Vol-
untary programs function by providing technical information and
public recognition to participants, and in return ask participants to
commit to the goal of pollution reduction, such as adopting techno-
logical changes that lead to pollution reduction.6  Voluntary initia-
tives signal a movement away from traditional adversarial relation-
ships between industries and governments towards those which are
more cooperative in nature and involve varying degrees of govern-
ment intervention.7  To date there has been considerable research
ventionist approach” to environmental policies, including command-and-control approach, as
being inefficient, ineffective, and less politically accepted); Steinzor, supra note 1, at 113-17
(criticizing the assumptions of command-and-control approach and the problems of “technol-
ogy-based standard”); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227,
1235-42 (1995) (arguing that “traditional command-and-control regulation breaks down under
its own weight” mainly due to its “bureaucratic process”).  But see Howard Latin, Ideal Versus
Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regula-
tory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1304 (1985) (defending the command-and-control ap-
proach by arguing that focus on economic efficiency is misplaced in “many environmental pro-
tection contexts”).
3. See Long, supra note 1, at 15.  On market mechanisms see generally Alan Moran,
Tools of Environmental Policy: Market Instruments versus Command-and-Control, in
MARKETS, THE STATE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 73 (Robyn Eckersley ed., 1995); Orts, supra
note 2, at 1242-47 (discussing four “conventional economic approaches to environmental regu-
lation”:  (1) a modern Pigouvian approach of assessing “taxes or charges to activities that are
environmentally harmful”; (2) Coasian approach of “internalizing externalities by expanding
property”; (3) “creation of tradeable pollution rights”; and (4) “harness[ing] the consciences of
consumers to favor environmentally friendly products”); WALDEMAR HOPFENBECK, THE
GREEN MANAGEMENT REVOLUTION: LESSONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL EXCELLENCE 11-13
(1993).
4. See Richard B. Stewart, Models for Environmental Regulation: Central Planning Ver-
sus Market-Based Approaches, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 547, 552-55 (1992) (arguing that
market-based approach “reduces overall social costs” and “advances environmental protec-
tion”).
5. See Long, supra note 1, at 15-16.
6. See Magali A. Delmas & Ann Terlaak, Voluntary Agreements for the Environment:
Institutional Constraints and Potential for Innovation, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS, 349-50
(K. Deketelaere &  Eric W. Orts eds. 2000).
7. See Kathryn Harrison, Talking with the Donkey: Cooperative Approaches to Environ-
mental Protection, 2 J. INDUS. ECOLOGY 51, 52 (1999).  See also Steinzor, supra note 1, at 112
(arguing that EPA’s major market-based initiatives are in nature voluntary, and thus, “without
industry cooperation, [EPA’s] reinvention cannot proceed”).
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into the application of regulatory and economic instruments for envi-
ronmental policy.8  Furthermore, there has been meaningful research
into the motivations for and advantages and disadvantages of volun-
tary initiatives, such as the ISO (International Organization for Stan-
dardization) 14000 series.9  However, to the author’s knowledge, such
research has not been based on independent empirical surveys of
firms.  Nor has there been any research based on empirical surveys of
U.S. firms.  In this respect, this paper partly fills this void by pre-
senting an analysis of ISO 14001, based on empirical surveys of U.S.
firms that have adopted the ISO 14001.10
An environmental management system (EMS) is one of the tools
which firms can use to voluntarily implement environmental policy.
An EMS consists of “a number of interrelated elements that function
together to help a firm manage, measure, and improve the environ-
mental aspects of its operations.”11  These elements include creating
environmental policies, setting objectives and targets, implementing
programs to achieve those objectives and targets, monitoring and
measuring the effectiveness of the programs, correcting problems, if
any, and reviewing the programs and their overall performance for
8. For research on voluntary initiatives, see generally Delmas & Terlaak, supra note 6, at
349-66; S. Labatt & V. W. Maclaren, Voluntary Corporate Environmental Initiatives: a Typol-
ogy and Preliminary Investigation, 16 ENV’T PLANNING GOVT. POL’Y 1919 (1998); Kathleen
Segerson & Thomas J. Miceli, Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Good or Bad News for
Environmental Protection?, 36 J. ENVTL. ECON.  MGMT. 108 (1998).
9. For research on cost benefit analysis of ISO 1400 and motivational aspect of firms
adopting it, see, e.g., Paulette L. Stenzel, Can the ISO 14000 Series Environmental Management
Standard Provide a Viable Alternative to Government Regulation?, 37 AM. BUS. L. J. 237, 263-
81 (2000); Amy Pesapane Lally, ISO 14000 and Environmental Cost Accounting: the Gateway
to the Global Market, 29 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 501, 513-30 (1998); Christina C. Benson, the
ISO 1400 International Standards: Moving Beyond Environmental Compliance, 22 N.C. J. INT’L
L. & COM. REG. 307, 338-63; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation: the Inter-
national Organization for Standardization and Global Lawmaking on Trade and the Environ-
ment, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 479, 522-38 (1995).
10. The ISO 14000 Series, including the ISO 14001 “Environmental Management Stan-
dards”, [hereinafter ISO 14000] and ISO 9000 Series [hereinafter ISO 9000] are available from
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), 11 West 42nd St., N.Y., N.Y., 10036; Phone:
212-642-4900; <http//www.ansi.org>.  The table of contents of ISO 14001: 1996 has also been
reproduced in Annex A.1 of ORG. ECON. COOPERATION DEV., ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES
AND ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION: WHAT DO STANDARDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS OFFER? 101, OECD Doc. ENV/EPOC/PPC(98)6/FINAL (May 4,
1998)[hereinafter OECD ISO Document].  The ISO 14001 standards may also be obtained
from any ISO member or from the ISO Central Secretariat, Case Postale 56, 1211 Geneva 20,
Switzerland.
11. Richard Welford, The Standardization of Environmental Management Systems, in
CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: SYSTEMS AND STRATEGIES 61, 66 (Richard
Welford ed., 2d ed. 1996).
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improvement thereof.12  However, an obvious problem would arise if
each firm designs its own system to meet its own particular needs: dif-
ferent non-compatible systems will emerge for each firm, making it
difficult to compare the environmental effects resulting from such
different systems.13  Even though the contents, aims, outcomes of ini-
tial reviews, and objectives of EMSs would probably differ from sec-
tor to sector, there are nonetheless common stages within an EMS
that any organization or firm can utilize to ensure that the environ-
ment is considered in its policies and processes.14  Without a common
international standard, firms would be forced to deal with dozens of
separate and potentially incompatible EMSs for every country in
which they conduct business.15  This could potentially increase the
transaction cost for such firms and also function as an undesirable
trade barrier.16
Since 1990 there have been efforts at the national level, within
the European Union, and at the international level to standardize
EMSs by defining the essential elements which such a system should
12. See generally Alan Netherwood, Environmental Management Systems, in CORPORATE
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: SYSTEMS AND STRATEGIES, supra note 11, 37-60.
13. For example, industry associations have developed various codes of practice, such as:
(1) the US Chemical Management Association’s Responsible Care Program, see
generally Jennifer Howard et. al., Standard or Smokescreen? Implementation of
a Voluntary Environmental Code, 42 CAL. MGMT. REV. 63, 77 (2000); Andrew
A. King & Michael J. Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The
Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Program, 43 ACADEMY MGMT. J. 698-
716 (2000);
(2) the Global Environmental Management Initiative (“GEMI”), see generally Su-
san Moore, Business incentives: Powerful tools to improve the environment, in  9
ENVTL. QUALITY MGMT., 71-77 (1999); and
(3) the Environmental Self Assessment Program, see generally Orin M. Kurland,
Keeping the Corporation Green, 41 RISK MGMT., 10, 11 (1994).
For a review of voluntary approaches, see generally Peter Kappas, The Politics, Policy, Practice
and Performance of Chemical Industry Self-Regulation (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles) (on file with the
UCLA library).
14. A basic EMS provides a general framework for the role of top management: the set-
ting of performance objectives, employee training, providing documentation, and continual
assessment of the system’s performance.  See Netherwood, supra note 12, at 37-60.
15. See generally Roht-Arriaza, supra note 9, at 491 (discussing how the European Com-
mission “was soon overwhelmed by the sheer number of potential regulations” when it “tried
to harmonize differing national standards on product-by-product, issue-by, issue basis”); Lally,
supra note 9, at 503- 04 (arguing that “national environmental legal systems throughout the
world” differ in their liability standards and the level of discretion in enforcement, and that was
main reason for emergence of the ISO).
16. See generally Roht-Arriaza, supra note 9, at 590-91 (discussing the dilemmas of har-
monizing EMS standards globally).
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contain.  For example, EMS standards, such as the British Standard
BS 775017 and the EU Eco-Management and Audit Scheme
(EMAS)18 have been developed to provide firms with a standardized
framework that would allow them to develop an EMS.  The interna-
tional standard ISO 14001 issued in 1996 is more ambitious as it is de-
signed to be applicable worldwide.19  In general, ISO 14001 provides
the basic framework for the establishment of an EMS, which can be
certified and audited.20  The main purposes for the creation of ISO
14001 was to provide an internationally accepted blueprint for sus-
tainable development, pollution prevention, and compliance assur-
ance, thereby expedite international trade by harmonizing otherwise
diffuse EMSs.21
However, it is not clear how successful the internationalization
of standardized management systems will be, as the diffusion of ISO
14001 varies significantly across the globe.22  Specific cultural, institu-
tional, and organizational issues might hamper the implementation of
such a standard.23  These concerns might be more acute for environ-
mental standards than for total quality management standards since
17. In 1990, the British Standard Institute (“BSI”) started to consider the question of third
party assessment of environmental performance. See Welford, supra note 11, at 64.  BSI had
tackled the issue of quality management using a system approach producing the quality system
standard BS 5750 (subsequently replaced by the ISO 9000 series of standards) and was of the
opinion that environmental performance within organizations could be tackled using a similar
approach, i.e. by the introduction of an environmental management system standard. See id. at
64g.  The draft version of British Standard 7750 was published in March 1992. See id. at 64g.
18. BS 7750 predated EMAS.  See Paula C. Murray, The International Environmental
Management Standard, ISO 14000: A Non-Tariff Barrier or a Step to an Emerging Global Envi-
ronmental Policy?, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 577, 585 (1997).  EMAS was adopted by the
European Union (EU) in 1993, and became effective in 1995.  See SALLY EDEN,
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND BUSINESS: IMPLICATIONS OF A CHANGING AGENDA 91 (1996).
The Commission originally intended to pursue mandatory participation but business lobbying
successfully prevented this. See id.  EMAS is a site-based registration system, i.e. the certifica-
tion is granted for individual industrial sites, but considers off-site activities that may have a
bearing upon environmental management at the registered site.  EMAS is primarily aimed at
the industrial sector.  See Council Regulation 1836/93, in OECD ISO Document, supra note 10
(allowing voluntary participation by companies in the industrial sector in a community eco-
management and audit scheme).
19. See INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO 14001 Standard:
Environmental Management Systems – Specification with Guidance for Use (1996) [hereinafter
ISO 14001 Standard].  See generally Kerry E. Rodgers, The ISO Environmental Standards Ini-
tiative, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 181, 275 (1996).
20. See ISO 14001 Standard, supra note 19.
21. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 9, at  490–502.  See also Lally, supra note 9, at 503-04.
22. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 9, at 509-10.
23. See id. at 503-08 (discussing conflicting views on EMS between European and non-
European delegations raised during the negotiation of the EMS standard).
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environmental issues are more value sensitive than quality issues, and
could create unique problems for firms.  For example, regulatory
violations by a firm applying for ISO 14001 might be revealed or dis-
closed during its environmental certification process, and if such vio-
lations are used by regulatory agencies or third parties against the
applicant firm, then such legal proceedings would result in additional
costs of certification to the applicant firm.24
At the same time, however, there are many benefits to adopting
ISO 14001, such as enhancement of a certified firm’s environmental
performance and enhancement of competitive advantage in certain
markets.25  Furthermore, these potential business advantages would
be linked not only to the specifics of each firm and industry, but also
to the value that stakeholders of such firms or industries, including
distributors, customers, and insurance companies, attribute to the
standard in its present form.26
Partly due to these benefits and costs of adopting ISO 14001, the
distribution of firms that implement ISO 14001 as an EMS standard
varies significantly across the globe.  As Table 1, infra, indicates, out
of the 7,887 ISO 14001 certified facilities worldwide in December
1998, approximately twenty percent (19.6%) were located in Japan
and approximately fifty percent (49.9%) in the European Union.27
Furthermore, firms from the developing countries and the transi-
tional economies of Central and Eastern Europe account for an in-
significant proportion of the total.  In contrast, the adoption of ISO
14001 has been relatively slow outside of Western Europe and the
Asia-Pacific Region, accounting for approximately fifty-two percent
(52.4%) and thirty-seven percent (37%) of the total certified firms,
respectively.
Interestingly, in the United States firms seem to have a suspi-
cious attitude toward ISO 14001.  Only 290 facilities were certified in
24. See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Roger Adams, ISO 14001: A Key Ingredient of Competitive Edge, 11 EVTL
LAW & MGMT. 103-104 (1999); Jacques Klaver & Jan Jonker, The Significance of Recent EMS
Standards as an Impetus for Improvement, 5 ECO-MANAGEMENT AND AUDITING 1, 1-5 (1998);
Benson, supra note 9, at 351-56.
26. See, e.g., Aseem Prakash, A New-Institutionalist Perspective on ISO 14000 and Respon-
sible Care, 8 BUS. STRAT. ENVT. 322-35 (1999); Stenzel, supra note 9, at 268-73 (identifying
suppliers, customers, investors, insurance companies and financial institutions as playing a posi-
tive role for ISO certification); Lally, supra note 9, at 525-27 (identifying consumers, investors,
and insurers as playing a positive role for ISO certification).
27. For the latest data on ISO 14000 certification throughout the world, see ISO WORLD,
The Number of ISO 14001/EMAS Certification/Registration of the World, (1999) (on file with
author).
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December 1998, accounting for only approximately four percent
(3.7%) of the certified facilities in the world.
TABLE 1.  ISO 14001 CERTIFIED FACILITIES WORLDWIDE (SOURCE
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ORGANIZATION)
Region Country
Certified
facilities % total
Western Europe 4136 52.4
UK 921 11.7
Austria 132 45.4
Denmark 314 218.1
Finland 206 70.8
France 295 204.9
Germany 651 8.3
Ireland 96 33.0
Italy 123 85.4
Netherlands 341 4.3
Spain 164 2.1
Sweden 304 3.9
Switzerland 360 4.6
Other 229 2.9
Asia-Pacific 2917 37.0
Japan 1542 19.6
Korea 263 3.3
Taiwan 203 2.6
Australia 352 4.5
Other 557 7.1
North America 434 5.5
Canada 104 1.3
USA 291 3.7
Mexico 39 0.5
Latin America 144 1.8
Africa/West Africa 138 1.7
Central and Eastern Europe 118 1.5
Total 7887 100.0
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The purpose of this paper is to shed light on why ISO 14001 has
been less attractive to U.S. firms compared to other regions, such as
Asia and Western Europe.  We start with an assumption that because
ISO 14001 certification is voluntary, firms will only seek certification
where it is in their best economical interest, i.e. the benefits of
adopting ISO 14001 certification outweigh the costs.  Based on such
an assumption, the paper identifies the benefits and costs for firms,
specifically U.S. firms, adopting ISO 14001 certification.28  It also de-
scribes the practical barriers and driving forces associated with the
adoption of ISO 14001 generally.29  Specifically, the paper proposes a
conceptual framework to explain the factors that either hamper or
facilitate the adoption of an EMS standard in a specific institutional
setting. 30  For example, it analyzes which elements of the U.S. institu-
tional and business environment impact the cost of ISO 14001 certifi-
cation, and describes how ISO 1400 certification can become a re-
source that might provide a competitive advantage to U.S. firms.31
This analysis is supported by primary data collected from a question-
naire mailed to a representative sample of ISO 14001 certified facili-
ties in the United States.32
The discussion is organized as follows:  Part II provides a general
introduction to ISO 14001 and describes the principles underlying it;
Part III identifies the general costs and benefits of adopting ISO
14001 to firms in general;  Part IV describes and analyzes the experi-
ence of U.S. firms in applying for ISO certification based on the em-
pirical data received by U.S. ISO 14001 certified firms; and finally,
based on this analysis, Part V discusses the necessary elements re-
quired to facilitate the adoption of ISO 14001 in the U.S.
28. See infra Part III.
29. See id.
30. See infra Parts III and IV.
31. See infra Part V.
32. The questionnaire was limited to U.S. certified firms only for two reasons.  First, we
were mainly looking for information on the incentives to seek certification as well as the diffi-
culties to implement certification.  Only certified firms would have enough knowledge of the
standard implementation to be able to respond to these questions.  Second, the population of
certified firms was so small (200) that it was impractical to compare them with a representative
sample of non-certified companies.
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II.  AN INTRODUCTION TO ISO
The development of the ISO 14000 Series was stimulated by two
important events:33  the 1992 Rio Conference34 and the signing of the
Final Act of the 1994 GATT Uruguay Round.35
The 1992 Global Environmental Initiative in Rio de Janeiro was
an essential step in the formation of ISO 14000.36  Over one hundred
of the countries attending the United Nations Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development (UNCED) committed to improving in-
ternational environmental management programs37 and petitioned
the International Standardization Organization to adopt this cause.38
The 1994 Uruguay Round Ministerial Decision on Trade and the
Environment established a committee under the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) to harmonize environmental and trade policy
based on two key factors:  1) “identifying trade and environmental
policy linkages to promote sustainable development” and 2) “avoid-
ing protectionist measures while promoting the environmental objec-
tive agreed to at the UNCED.”39
On the heels of ISO 9000’s success,40 the International Stan-
dardization Organization responded to demands to address the field
33. See, e.g., Stenzel, supra note 9, at 253.
34. See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 13, 1992, UNCED
Document A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874.
35. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125.
36. See W. M. VON ZHAREN, ISO 14000: UNDERSTANDING THE ENVIRONMENTAL
STANDARDS 8 (1996); Lally, supra note 9, at 505.
37. The international community recognized the vast scope of environmental problems at
the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. See Rio Declaration, supra note 34.  Agenda 21, a
non-binding agreement reached at the Summit, catalogs the wide variety of environmental
problems facing the world today. See Agenda 21, § 8.1 <http://www.unep.org/Documents/
Default.asp? DocumentID=52>.
38. See OECD ISO Document, supra note 10, at 22.
39. Ridgway M. Hall & Kristine A. Tockman, International Corporate Environmental
Compliance and Auditing Programs, 25 ENVTL. L. REP., 10395, 10404 (1995).
40. While the ISO originally focused on product technical standards, in 1979, it decided to
address quality management and assurance standards.  See TOM TIBOR AND IRA FELDMAN,
ISO 14000:  A GUIDE TO THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS 29 (1996).  As a result, ISO
9000 was published as a final standard in 1987. See id.  This system establishes standards for
quality management in all areas of business and a process for registration or verification of
compliance. See id. at 29–30.  ISO 9000 is voluntary, yet market forces have mandated ISO
9000 compliance as a virtual passport to international business. See id. at 27–31.  Up to the end
of December 1998, at least 271,966 ISO 9000 certificates have been awarded in 143 countries
worldwide. See ISO, The ISO Survey of ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 Certificates: the Eighth Cycle:
up to and including 1998, 2 <http://www.iso.ch/infoe/8thcyclesurvey.pdf>.
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of environmental law and pollution.41  The ISO responded by estab-
lishing the Strategic Advisory Group on the Environment (SAGE) to
determine whether an international environmental management
standard could “promote a common approach to environmental
management, enhance an organization’s ability to attain and measure
improvements in environmental performance, and facilitate trade
and remove trade barriers.”42  SAGE assessed the need for an inter-
national EMS standard that would encourage responsible environ-
mental management without violating GATT.43  As a result, Techni-
cal Committee 207 (TC 207) was formed in 1993 to develop the ISO
14000 Series.44
In September 1996, ISO issued the first edition of the ISO 14000
Series, a set of guidelines for developing systems and practices in six
environmental sectors, each containing one or more standards:45
(1) ISO standards 14001 and 14004: Environmental Manage-
ment Systems;
(2) ISO standards 14010 to 14012: Environmental Auditing;
(3) ISO standards 14020 to 14025: Environmental Labels and
Declarations
(4) ISO standard 14031: Environmental Performance Evalua-
tion;
(5) ISO standards 14040 to 14043: Life Cycle Assessment; and
41. See TIBOR & FELDMAN, supra note 40, at 32.  The International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) was founded in 1946 to “develop manufacturing, trade, and communica-
tion standards . . . . The goal of ISO standards are to facilitate the efficient exchange of goods
and services." See id. at 27.  There are 111 member countries within the ISO and each country
has 1 official representative. See id. at 27. The United States’ representative is the ANSI. See id.
See also supra note 10, 1-5 (1998); Benson, supra note 9, at 351-56.
42. TIBOR & FELDMAN, supra note 40, at 32.
43. See id.
44. See ANSI, Formation, and Subject Areas of ISO/TC207 (visited September 30, 2000)
< http://web.ansi.org/public/iso14000/form_2.html> [hereinafter ISO/TC207 Formation].  See
also ISO/TC 207, About ISO/TC 207 (visited September 30, 2000) <http://
www.tc207.org/aboutTC207/index.html> [hereinafter ISO/TC207 Introduction].  Originally, six
TC 207 subcommittees and one working group cover the following focus areas:  (1) environ-
mental management systems (SC1); (2) environmental auditing (SC2); (3) environmental labels
and declarations (SC3); (4) environmental performance evaluation (SC4); (5) life-cycle assess-
ment (SC5); (6) environmental management terms and definitions (SC6); and (7) environ-
mental aspects in product standards (WG1). See id.  However, thereafter, two more working
groups have been formed, i.e., forestry (WG2) and design of the environment (WG3).  See su-
pra ISO/TC207 Introduction.  For additional discussion on TC 207, see TIBOR & FELDMAN,
supra note 40, at 32-38.
45. See id.
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(6) ISO standard 14060: Environmental Aspects in Product
Standards.
The first and only edition that was published in 1996 focused on
the EMS standard ISO 14001 and the Environmental Auditing stan-
dards (ISO 14010 – 14012).46  ISO 14001 is the only certifiable stan-
dard in the ISO 14000 Series, and all other standards in the Series de-
scribe supporting functions, which serve to maximize the
effectiveness of the ISO 14001 EMS. 47  However, the implementation
of these supporting standards is not required for ISO 14001 certifica-
tion.48  There are five requirements of ISO 14001:  1) formation of a
corporate environmental policy and commitment to an EMS; 2) de-
velopment of a plan for implementation; 3) implementation and op-
eration of the EMS; 4) monitoring and possible corrective action;
and, 5) top management review and continual improvement.49
III.  CONCEPTUAL APPROACH OF ISO 14001:  ANALYSIS OF
RELEVANT FACTORS THAT IMPACT GENERAL COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF ADOPTING ISO 14001
The following discussion is dedicated to our conceptual ap-
proach.  Based on the assumption that firms would adopt ISO 14001
only if its potential benefits offset its costs due to the voluntary na-
ture of ISO 14001, we will analyze various relevant factors that im-
pact the general costs and benefits of adopting ISO 14001.  Section A
describes how the institutional set-up can impact the transaction costs
of acquiring ISO 14001 certification.  Section B discusses the limita-
tion of the “process standard” of ISO 14001, the positive role of
stakeholders, and the potential competitive advantage that firms
might gain by adopting ISO 14001.  Section C discusses how IS0
14001 could provide valuable past experiences to firms in need.
46. The other sections were published in draft and are still being revised by TC 207.  See
ISO/TC207 Introduction, supra note 44 (stating that “ISO/TC 207 is the ‘umbrella’ committee
under which the ISO 14000 series of environmental management standards are being devel-
oped”).
47. Cf. ISO/TC207 Introduction, supra note 44.
48. See id.
49. See ISO 14001 Standard, supra note 19.
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A. Institutional Environment as a Barrier and Incentive for Adoption
of ISO 14001
Building on the seminal work of Douglass North, the new insti-
tutional economics (NIE) considers institutions and public policies to
be critical elements of the business environment.50  The institutional
environment, which creates the rules of the game among economic
agents, influences an agent’s ability to efficiently contract with other
agents.51  This can put constraints on industrial organizations, the
market in which they grow, and the way firms interact with their
business partners.52  With reference to environmental issues, the insti-
tutional environment is an essential influencing factor for firms be-
cause it creates not only the rules of the game, but also the market
for environmental products and services.53  Uncertainty in the institu-
tional environment, such as the behavior of environmental regulatory
agencies, could prevent firms from seeking ISO 14001 certification.54
For example, regulatory violations by an ISO applicant firm might be
revealed or disclosed during its environmental certification process,
and if such violations are used by regulatory agencies or other third
parties against the applicant firm, then such legal proceedings would
result in additional cost of certification to the applicant firm.55
50. See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).
51. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 325 (1996).
52.  See id. On the impact of property right systems on innovative strategies see generally
Kenneth J. Arrow, Technical Information and Industrial Structure, 2 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE
5, 645-52 (1996); Robert Merges & Richard Nelson, On Limiting or Encouraging Rivalry in
Technical Progress: the Effect of Patent Scope Decisions, 25 J. ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORG.
1-24 (1994). On the influence of antitrust regulation on cooperative strategies see generally
Carl Shapiro & Robert Willig, On the Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint Venture, 4 J.
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 113-30 (1990).  On the effect of government’s credible commitment
of on firm’s behavior see generally Brian Levy & Pablo Spiller, The Institutional Foundations
of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation, 10 J.
LAW, ECONOMICS & ORG. 201-246 (1994); Barry Weingast, The Economic Role of Political
Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J. LAW ECO. ORG.
1-32 (1995).
53. See generally FOREST REINHARDT & RICHARD, BUSINESS MANAGEMENT AND THE
NATURAL ENVIRONMENT (1996).
54. See generally Rodgers, supra note 19, at 267-74 (discussing various negative implica-
tions for U.S. firms derived from disclosure and auditing requirements from adopting ISO
14000).
55. See id.  See also Benson, supra note 9, at 347, 348 (noting that “some companies have
hesitated to initiate a formal environmental management program for fear that a large amount
of internal documentation will be created that may be subject to discovery by regulatory agen-
cies or other potential opposing parties”).
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Many U.S. firms considering ISO certification struggle with the
potential for discovery of regulatory violations that the firm has not
yet identified or resolved.56  The process of ISO 14001 certification
may inadvertently lead to the discovery of non-compliance with ap-
plicable environmental regulations.  While forcing compliance with
environmental laws and regulations should theoretically be consid-
ered a benefit of implementing ISO 14001 for an applicant firm, the
identification of violations during the implementation phase or self or
third-party audits can lead to real liabilities to the firm.57  Specifically,
applicable environmental regulations may have disclosure require-
ments and/or impose liability without showing of intent or negli-
gence, i.e., strict liability.58
Another potential risk of liability comes from the fact that ISO
14001, in order to track the effectiveness of the system, requires
companies to document the details of environmental aspects of their
operations that are not related to compliance with any regulatory
scheme.59  Audits conducted under ISO 14001 check these documents
and may point out weaknesses in the firm’s handling of environ-
mental matters, such as records of system failures and minor spills.
These findings, while they may not be governed by any regulations,
might still be used as incriminating evidence in future legal proceed-
ings.60  In effect, a company adopting an EMS with a written policy
56. See infra Table 6, where sixty-nine percent (69%) of the surveyed U.S. firms identified
“lack of regulatory flexibility” as “mild to serious constraint” in adopting ISO 14001 certifica-
tion.  See also Rodgers, supra note 19, at 271.
57. See Rodgers, supra note 19, at 270, 71 (discussing the risks for companies conducting
audits or preparing documentation pursuant to ISO 14000, even under the current EPA’s fa-
vorable policies for ISO 14000 certification).
58. See Robert C. Wilson, What You Don’t Know Can Definitely Hurt You, 30 POLLUTION
ENGINEERING 33 (1998).
59. See ISO 14001 § 4.5, supra, note 19.
60. See, e.g., Rodgers, supra note 19, at 270-71 (discussing how “information generated
and documented in connection with the ISO EMS, EPE, and audit standards could be subject
to discovery in private tort actions in the United States,” in effect providing “free discovery” to
private plaintiffs); Donald Stever, The Private Sector’s Need for Environmental Secrecy: Prod-
uct Regulation and the Secrecy of Proprietary Information, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 224, 230-31
(1993) (noting that information disclosed “to the government in regulatory submissions or in
the context of a Superfund action provides free discovery to private plaintiffs, because the po-
tential plaintiffs can access this information through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
request”); Benson, supra note 9, at 347-48 (commenting that “[d]espite some reassurances from
the EPA and state agencies, many U.S. companies remain concerned that undergoing a third
party ISO audit may expose them to legal liability if information from the audit is made avail-
able to regulatory agencies”).
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specifying targets and objectives on environmental matters may also
be defining a standard under which it may be held accountable.61
Levy and Spiller highlight how the credibility and effectiveness
of a regulatory framework, and hence its ability to facilitate private
investment, vary with a country’s political and social institutions.62  It
is suggested here that the institutional environment’s commitment to
industry could take the form of regulatory flexibility for ISO 14001
companies.63  For example, in recognition of ISO 14001 compliance as
a positive behavior, environmental regulatory agencies might choose
not to use information released during the process of certification
against an ISO applicant company.
Thus, this work proposes that, if applicable regulatory agencies
do not change the rules of the game to allow some regulatory flexi-
bility and shed a positive light on applicants of ISO 14001 certifica-
tion, then the cost of obtaining ISO certification will be too high for
certain firms who are subject to such regulatory agencies’ rules and
policies.
B. Limitation of a Process Standard, the Positive Role of
Stakeholders, and Competitive Advantage
An EMS standard like ISO 14001 can be identified as an intan-
gible resource or a capability since it indicates to the firm’s environ-
mental management skills.64  However, at present it is not clear how
customers can assess the value of an ISO 14001 certification.65  The
61. See generally Michael S. Mostek, Limited Privilege and Immunity for Self-Evaluative
Environmental Audits in Nebraska: Moving Environmental Performance to the Next Level, 32
CREIGHTON L. REV. 545 (1998).
62. See Brian Levy & Pablo T. Spiller, The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Com-
mitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation, 10 J. L. ECON ORG. 201,
205-209 (1994).
63. As Levy & Spiller note, “regulation is likely to be far more credible—and the regula-
tory problem less severe—in countries with political systems that constrain executive and leg-
islative discretion,” i.e., constrain the flexibility of such regulative agencies.  However, they go
on to note that such inflexibility could hurt efficiency, by stating “credibility is often achieved
at the expense of flexibility....The same mechanisms that make it difficult to impose arbitrary
changes in the rules may also make it difficult to enact sensible rules in the first place, or to ef-
ficiently adapt the rules in the face of changing circumstances.” See id. at 206-07.
64. See Stuart L. Hart, A Natural-Resource-Based View of the Firm, 20 ACADEMY OF
MGMT. REV. 986, 1000 (1995) .  See also Mostek, supra note 61, at 554 (noting that “[a]s the
environmental ethic has emerged, more businesses realize that good environmental manage-
ment is a necessary component of effective business management practices”).
65. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 9, at 534 (remarking that “[a] major drawback to the cur-
rent IOS effort is its heavily procedural nature….The standards contain no specific commit-
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standard itself can be regarded as more a process standard than a
product standard.66  The ISO 14001 certified firm is unable to benefit
from an actual label that would signal to the market that a product
has been produced with environmental sensitivity.67  This discussion is
complicated by the fact that consumers might not identify or under-
stand the advantages of ISO 14001, as the standard does not provide
any real measure of environmental performance.68  Indeed, the stan-
dard not only fails to establish absolute requirements for environ-
mental performance other than a commitment to compliance with
applicable regulations, but it also fails to identify environmental per-
formance as a factor in the actual certification process.69
True to the well-known axiom “you can’t manage what you don’t
measure,” section 4.5.1 of ISO 14001 requires an organization to have
procedures to “monitor and measure, on a regular basis, the key
characteristics of its operations and activities that can have a signifi-
cant impact on the environment” as part of the checking and correc-
tive action portion of its EMS.70  Although ISO 14001 requires an or-
ganization to measure and track its environmental performance,
there are no adopted or commonly accepted environmental perform-
ance indicators.71
ments to emissions reductions, source reduction, materials or industrial process changes, or the
like.”).
66. See id.
67. ISO 14001 is not linked to ISO 14020-14025 which are the environmental labeling
standards discussed under the supervision of Technical Committee 207. See supra note 20, ISO
14020 (covering Environmental Labels and Declarations: General Principles); ISO 14021 (cov-
ering Environmental Labels and Declarations: Self-declared environmental claims (Type II
environmental labeling)); ISO 14024 (Environmental Labels and Declarations: Principles and
procedures (Type I environmental labeling));  ISO/TR 14025 (Environmental Labels and
Declarations: Type III environmental declarations).
68. Cf. Stenzel, supra note 9, at 284 (noting that “ISO 14001 certification is based on goals
set by the company being certified,” and this could be viewed as a flaw “because companies
may set very lenient goals for themselves”); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 9, at 534 (commenting
that “[a] major drawback to the current IOS effort is its heavily procedural nature”).
69. See ISO 14001 Standard, § 4.5.1, supra note 19.
70. ISO 14001 does not refer to the term “environmental performance”. See id.  In fact,
Section 4.5.1, which covers monitoring and measurement, provides that “the organization shall
establish and maintain documented procedures to monitor and measure, on a regular basis, the
key characteristics of its operations and activities that can have a significant impact on the envi-
ronment.  This shall include the recording of information to track performance, relevant opera-
tional controls and conformance with the organization’s environmental objectives and targets.”
Id.
71. See ISO 14031, supra note 10 (entitled Guidelines on Environmental Performance
Evaluation), containing over 100 examples of measures and indicators.  However, it does not
propose a core set of metrics for comparison and benchmarking of performance, nor does it
establish performance levels.
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Due to this lack of definition of precise environmental variables
for monitoring purposes, the resulting data may not provide compa-
nies, policy-makers, and the public with accurate information they
can use to make comparative judgements about organizational envi-
ronmental performance issues.  Thus, it would be very difficult for
consumers to put a value on this resource.
If not a direct signal to consumers, ISO 14001 can be a signal to
other stakeholders72 that the management of a certified firm is envi-
ronmentally sound.73  As noted by Lally, “[t]he expanding nature of
environmental risks and liabilities has led investment and insurance
groups to require more thoughtful environmental analysis in the pre-
paratory stages of a transaction.”74  In this respect, companies with
pollution prevention programs and EMSs like ISO 14001 should be
far more attractive to insurance underwriters and could gain better
rates.75  However, the difficulty in assessing environmental perform-
ance might also be a problem for these stakeholders since they lack
tangible elements on which to base their analysis of a firm’s environ-
mental performance.  But this limitation can be minimized in certain
72. Numerous definitions have been set forth to identify stakeholders.  At one end, there
are the broad conceptualizations that regard stakeholders as any individual or group having an
interest in or in any way affected by the corporation.  See generally R. EDWARD FREEMAN,
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984); ARCHIE B. CARROLL,
BUSINESS AND SOCIETY: ETHICS AND STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT (1989).  In the middle,
there are theories that define stakeholders as those groups or individuals who assume some
degree of risk in their contacts or activities with the corporation.  See generally M. Clarkson, A
Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating Corporate Social Performance, 20 Acad-
emy of Management Review  (1995).  Finally, at the other end, there are narrow views that only
recognize stakeholders as those whose relationship to the firm is primarily economic.  See gen-
erally M. Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, New York
Times Magazine (September 13) (1970).  Regardless of the differences in these definitions of
stakeholder, these models all encompass a relationship-based on a two-way exchange, i.e.,
stakeholders are not only affected by the corporation but can also have an effect on its activi-
ties as well.  For the purpose of our discussion, we adopt this relation-based definition of
“stakeholder”, which would include, but not limited to, employees, distributors, suppliers, cus-
tomers, shareholders, and regulatory agencies.
73. See Stenzel, supra note 9, at 283 (noting that “[a]t a minimum, ISO 14001 certifications
will help citizens identify those companies that are likely to be responsible stewards of the envi-
ronment”).
74. Lally, supra note 9, at 526.
75. See generally Stenzel, supra note 9, at 272 (noting that “[a] growing number of individ-
ual investors and investment and mutual fund managers are searching for environmentally re-
sponsible firms…. [I]nsurance companies may reduce rates on insurance policies covering acci-
dental pollution releases if a company demonstrates that it has an EMS in place”); Roberto
Ceniceros, ISO 14001 Can Enhance an Overall Plan, 34 BUSINESS INSURANCE 6 (Feb 7, 2000)
(observing that insurers agree that “[c]onforming to ISO 14001 standards can be part of a com-
prehensive environmental risk management program”).
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industries, where environmentally sound process segments of manu-
facturing are key factors underlying a firm’s profitability.  These in-
dustries, which would seem to include the electronics industry76 and
the chemical industry77 would therefore be more likely to pursue ISO
14001 certification.78
If ISO 14001 is used by many firms in one market, and if firms
require their suppliers to be ISO 14001 certified, we could safely as-
sume that ISO 14001 standardization will become a requirement for
any and all firms wishing to access this market.79  Certification will
function as a barrier hampering a non-certified firm’s entry into the
market. 80  For example, the large diffusion of environmental man-
agement standards such as BS 7750 or EMAS in some sectors of
Europe might act as a real obstacle to the entry of non-certified for-
eign firms into the European market.  Similarly, since ISO 14001 is
supposed to be applicable on a global scale, if it is successfully dif-
fused globally in certain industries, then ISO certified firms would
have a competitive advantage over non-certified firms in those indus-
tries.81  Indeed ISO 14001 would be seen as a resource that might fa-
cilitate firms’ entry into foreign markets where EMS standards are
76. See Benson, supra note 9, at 341 (noting that “[a]s an increasing number of govern-
ment contractors become certified, there will be significant incentives for companies in indus-
tries which are heavily dependent on government contracts—such as electronics and aero-
space—to gain the certification”).
77. The chemical industry has already adopted the “Responsible Care” program, which
represents the longest established industry code of Environmental Health and Safety practice
as implemented by sixteen U.S. chemical companies, and it bears some similarity to ISO 14001.
See generally, Howard, supra note 13, at 63-82.
78. See generally Stanley Fielding, ISO 14001 Delivers Effective Environmental Manage-
ment & Profits, 43 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY 27 (1998) (explaining how many companies in the
electronics industry are realizing that instituting a sound environmental management system,
such as ISO 14001 actually leads to higher profits, produces a positive public relations image,
and results in a cleaner earth).
79. See Stenzel, supra note 9, at 270 (arguing that “[a]s a result of green procurement, ISO
14001 certification may become a de facto requirement for doing business with the U.S. gov-
ernment and large business”).
80. See Lally, supra note 9, at 512-14.
81. See Benson, supra note 9, at 342 (noting that “[o]nce the larger multinational firms
being to require ISO 14000 certification of their suppliers, a domino effect will lead to a wide-
spread adoption of the standards along the supply chain of various industries…Certification
will at first be viewed as a means of gaining competitive advantage within a particular industry,
but will ultimately be perceived as a de facto “passport” for doing business internationally.”).
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already requirements.82  This would support the trading-up hypothesis
developed by Vogel.83
C. Role of Past Experience
It is clear that past experience plays an important role in devel-
oping resources, i.e., path dependency.84  Although ISO 14001 is open
to any firm that wishes to invest in obtaining the certification, there is
a learning curve at the sector or even institutional level that might fa-
cilitate the adoption of the certification.85  For this reason, it is sub-
mitted here that it is easier for a firm in a particular industry to ob-
tain certification in an environment where other firms in that same
industry have already been certified.  Since the standard does not of-
fer much guidance, it is important that firms be able to benefit from
the experience of other firms through an established pool of consult-
ants.  In an environment where many firms within the same industry
have been certified, the development of knowledgeable consulting
companies will be useful for firms in search of certification.  In such a
context, a certification organization such as the ISO might be useful
for firms seeking ISO 14001.  Specifically, ISO 14001 can be a re-
source difficult to acquire for those firms which do not benefit from
an environment where other similar firms have already had experi-
ence with the certification procedure.  Along these lines, ISO 14001 is
clearly derived from ISO 9000—the standard for total quality man-
agement.86  Firms that know how to deal with ISO 9000 should be
more inclined to obtain ISO 14001 certification.87
In summary, since ISO 14001 is a voluntary standard, we assume
that firms will implement it if they are confident that the potential
costs of certification are less than the benefits resulting from the
business opportunities that the standard will ultimately provide them.
First, the institutional environment can impact both the cost of ac-
82. See id.
83. See generally DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (1995) (arguing that that increased economic interde-
pendence has been associated with stronger, not weaker, consumer and environmental regula-
tions).
84. On discussion on the “learning curve” see generally David Besanko et. al., THE
ECONOMICS OF STRATEGY 196-202 (1996).
85. See Benson, supra note 9, at 356, 357.
86. See ISO 9000, supra note 10.
87. See Benson, supra note 9, at 356, 357 (noting that “ISO 14000 should be relatively easy
and less costly to implement for firms that have already been through the ISO 9000 certifica-
tion”).
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quiring certification as well as the ability of firms to reap the full
benefits from certification.  Second, since the ISO standard is in na-
ture a process standard, and thus does not present “tangible” results
regarding improvement of a firm’s environmental performance,
stakeholders belief in the benefits of ISO 14001 standardization and
their commitment to promote it is crucial for the success of ISO certi-
fication in a certain industry.  Furthermore, if this is achieved, then
the certified firms can transform its certification into a competitive
advantage.  In addition, firms would be more likely to pursue certifi-
cation if they belong to a sector where process manufacturing as well
as pollution prevention are core components of business advantage,
i.e., where process standards have a special value to the industry.  It
seems likely that firms would also pursue ISO 14001 certification if
they wanted to enter countries where certification was required.  Cer-
tification would then be similar to, and would function as, an entry
barrier.  Finally, ISO 14001 would be easier to acquire for firms
which have already been ISO 9000 certified and which belong to an
industry or a country where there is some significant experience in
ISO 14001 certification.
IV.  ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT CONSIDERATION MADE BY U.S.
FIRMS IN APPLYING FOR ISO 14001
As noted in Table 1, the number of U.S. certified facilities is low
compared to other European and Asian countries.88  With 291 certi-
fied facilities representing 90 firms in 1998, the United States lagged
behind 9 other countries, the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden,
the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, Japan, France, and Austra-
lia.89  Within the U.S., many ISO 14001 certification decisions were
made by non-US firms.  Approximately thirty percent (30.8%) of
these certified firms were headquartered outside the U.S.90  Of the
foreign multinational firms that had certified their facilities in the
U.S., the largest percentages were from Japan accounting for ap-
proximately nineteen percent (19.2%) and the European Union ac-
counting for approximately ten percent (9.6%).91  This raises the
question of why U.S. firms are generally deterred from seeking ISO
14001 certification, which requires an inquiry into the U.S. environ-
88. See supra Table 1.
89. See id.
90. See PRATIMA BANSAL, TAKING STOCK OF ISO 14001 CERTIFICATIONS, FINAL
REPORT 8 (Environmental Protection Agency Working Paper No. 17, 1999).
91. See id. at 9.
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ment.  To evaluate the incentives and barriers to the implementation
of ISO 14001 for U.S. firms, a questionnaire was mailed to U.S. certi-
fied companies.  Of the 152 corporate questionnaires mailed, a total
of 55 responses accounting for thirty-six percent (36%) were received
as of February 15, 1999.  The responses represent thirty percent
(30%) of the 200 U.S. ISO 14001 certified firms identified in the Glo-
bus International Database on November 1998.92
The geographical location of respondents closely mirrors the dis-
tribution of certified firms in the U.S., as indicated in Table 2 below.
The distribution of responding firms by industry is also similar to the
actual distribution of ISO 14001 U.S. certified firms, as indicated in
Table 3 below.  Seventy-eight percent (78%) of the certified facilities
in the sample belonged to large companies with annual sales greater
than $500,000,000.
TABLE 2.  GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF CERTIFIED FIRMS IN THE
U.S. AND OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONDENTS
U.S. Distribution Questionnaire Responses
West 18% 15%
Midwest 19% 18%
Central 10% 9%
Northeast 34% 42%
Southeast 18% 15%
Total 99% 99%
92. See Directory of Registered Organization/North American (visited October 2, 2000)
<http://www.worldpreferred.com> (Globus Registry website has been changed to World-
preferred).  It should be noted that the population of certified firms was so small (200) that it
was practically impossible to compare it to a representative sample of non-certified companies.
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Frequency Percent Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid 4 7.3 7.3 7.3
Chemicals 5 9.1 9.1 16.4
Electric/Gas Service 3 5.5 5.5 21.8
Electronics 10 18.2 18.2 40.0
Engineering 4 7.3 7.3 47.3
Industrial Machinery 4 7.3 7.3 54.5
Instrument & related 4 7.3 7.3 61.8
Metal Mining 1 1.8 1.8 63.6
Metal Products 2 3.6 3.6 67.3
Misc. Manufacturing 1 1.8 1.8 69.1
Paper 1 1.8 1.8 70.9
Primary Metal Industry 4 7.3 7.3 78.2
Printing & Publishing 1 1.8 1.8 80.0
Textiles 2 3.6 3.6 83.6
Transport Equipment 9 16.4 16.4 100.0
TOTAL 55 100.0 100.0
TABLE 3.  DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS BY INDUSTRY
The questionnaire asked managers to state the importance of
several factors that led to their decision to become ISO 14001 certi-
fied.  Three of the questions from the survey were selected for analy-
sis in this paper.93  The first question concerns the incentives for a
firm to adopt ISO 14001, as indicated in Table 4 below.  The second
question concerns the level of involvement of stakeholders in assist-
ing firms to design their ISO 14001 EMS, as indicated in Table 5 be-
low.  The last question pertains to the constraints associated with the
implementation of ISO 14001 certification, as indicated in Table 6
below.  The responses to the first two questions were rated on a five-
93. See Brad Edwards et al., The Effectiveness of ISO 14001 in the United States 145-50
(1999) (unpublished M.E.S.M. group thesis, University of California, Santa Barbara) (on file
with the author) [hereinafter U.S. ISO Firm Survey].
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point scale from non-important to very important.  The responses to
the third question were ranked from serious constraints to no con-
straint.
TABLE 4.  INCENTIVES TO ISO CERTIFICATION
Descriptive Statistics % %
Not important
to important
(1-3)
Quite important to very
important (4-5)
Improved management of
environmental impacts
28 72
Public demonstration of environmental
stewardship
34 66
Reduced pollution 38 62
Reduced environmental risk 38 62
Increased competitive advantage 38 62
Improved compliance with government
regulations
45 55
Greater market share 46 54
Improved regulatory compliance 49 51
Increased international trade
opportunities
49 51
Improved internal communication
among managers
53 47
Access to new markets 57 43
Marketing/Advertising opportunity 57 43
Communication with the community 60 40
Increased shareholder value 64 36
Customer requirement 68 32
Fewer regulatory fines 73 27
Greater permit flexibility 76 24
Revised approach to regulatory
inspections
77 23
Decreased insurance costs 85 15
Decreased permit costs 85 15
Greater access to capital 87 13
Buyer requirement 90 10
Lender requirement 94 6
N=53
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TABLE 5.  STAKEHOLDERS’ INVOLVEMENT IN DESIGN OF ISO 14001
Descriptive Statistics % %
Not involved to
involved
(1-3)
Quite to very
involved (4-5)
Involvement of environmental managers 11 89
Involvement of senior management 39 61
Involvement of employees 43 57
Involvement of corporate representatives 54 46
Involvement of lawyers 83 17
Involvement of marketing/public relations 89 11
Involvement of regulatory officials 93 7
Involvement of shareholders 96 4
Involvement of customers/clients 98 2
Involvement of community members 100 0
Involvement of distributors 100 0
Valid N (listwise)= 53.00
TABLE 6.  CONSTRAINTS TO THE ADOPTION OF ISO 14001
Descriptive Statistics % %
Mild to serious
constraint (1-4)
Not a
constraint (5)
Lack of top management support 77 23
Design costs of ISO 14001 EMS 75 25
Lack of regulatory flexibility 69 31
Registration costs 67 33
Lack of understanding of ISO requirements 67 33
Annual costs of maintaining an ISO 14001 EMS 67 33
Lack of time to implement a quality EMS 65 35
Uncertainty with regulatory agencies’ utilization
of EMS audit information
62 38
Potential legal penalties from voluntary
disclosure
60 40
Lack of personnel to implement/manage EMS 58 42
Valid N (listwise)= 52.00
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A. U.S. Institutional Environment for ISO 14001
As to whether the regulatory framework favors or discourages
the adoption of ISO 14001, the variables considered in the survey
were:  “greater permit flexibility,” “revised approach to regulatory
inspections,” “fewer regulatory fines,” and “decreased permit
costs.”94  These variables were rated from not important (1) to very
important (5).  A great majority of firms did not consider these fac-
tors to be important incentives to their decision to become ISO 14001
certified.95  More than seventy-six percent (76%) of the firms in our
sample considered “greater permit flexibility” to be not a very impor-
tant factor in their decision to apply for ISO 14001 certification.96
Likewise, seventy-seven percent (77%) of the firms said that “revised
approach to regulation inspections” was not very important; seventy-
six percent (76%) said the same for “greater permit flexibility;” sev-
enty-three percent (73%) for “fewer regulatory fines;” and eighty-
five percent (85%) for “decreased permit costs.”97  In line with this
survey, it seems clear that the institutional set-up does not provide
any incentive for U.S. firms to adopt the standard.  In fact, the insti-
tutional set-up seems to be more of a constraint, hampering firms
from adopting the standard.
In contrast, the variables that represent regulatory constraints,
“uncertainty with regulatory agencies’ utilization of EMS audit in-
formation,” “potential legal penalties from voluntary disclosure,” and
“lack of regulatory flexibility” were considered to be important by
firms.98  The five-point scale ranged from “not a constraint” (1) to “a
very serious constraint” (5).  Sixty-two percent (62%) of surveyed
firms considered “uncertainty with regulatory agencies’ utilization of
EMS audit information” to be a constraint.99  Likewise, sixty percent
(60%) indicated that the “potential legal penalties from voluntary
disclosure,” and sixty-nine percent (69%) for “lack of regulatory
flexibility.”100
94. See supra Table 4.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See supra Table 6.
99. See id.
100. See id.
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B. Costs of Adopting ISO 14001 for U.S. Firms
The survey indicated that the design cost of ISO 14001 was less
than $100,000 for seventy-five percent (75%) of the firms.101  Fur-
thermore, the initial registration cost was less than $50,000 for ninety-
four percent (94%) of the firms.102  It is quite difficult to evaluate the
full range of transactional costs of the certification process since the
majority of the firms implemented the standard only recently.  How-
ever, several variables can approximate these costs, namely, “design
cost,” “certification cost,” and “annual cost of maintaining an ISO
14001 EMS.”103
The survey indicates that the “design costs of ISO 14001 EMS”
are a more important constraint than are the “registration costs” and
the “annual cost of maintaining an ISO 14001.”104  Seventy-five per-
cent (75%) of the firms in our sample considered that the “design
costs of ISO 14001 EMS” was a constraint.105  This is compared to
sixty-seven percent (67%) for the “registration costs” and the “an-
nual costs of maintaining an ISO 14001 EMS.”106  A majority of firms,
sixty-two percent (62%), considered the “lack of time to implement a
quality EMS” as a constraint for adopting ISO 14001, and fifty-eight
percent (58%) felt the same about the “lack of personnel to imple-
ment/manage EMS.”107
C. Past Experience in Standardization and Stakeholders’ Involvement
Eighty-five percent (85%) of the facilities in our sample are also
ISO 9000 certified.108  According to the survey, it is quite clear that
the experience in dealing with ISO 9000 positively impacted the deci-
sion of firms to obtain ISO 14001 certification.  Furthermore, of the
fifty-five (55) facilities in the sample, sixteen (16) belonged to firms
101. See U.S. ISO Firm Survey, supra note 93, wherein the firms surveyed were asked the
question (#14):  “How much did it cost to design your ISO 14001 EMS, excluding initial certifi-
cation costs?” This required them to include internal as well as external costs, i.e., employee
time, process design, and consultants.
102. See id. The firms surveyed therein were asked the question (#15):  “How much did it
cost to initially register your facility (certification costs)?”
103. See supra Table 6.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See U.S. ISO Firm Survey, supra note 93, wherein the firms surveyed were asked the
question (#3): “Is your facility ISO 9000 certified?”
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which had at least two facilities ISO 14001 certified accounting for
thirty percent (30%).109
Since many certification decisions are made by non-U.S. firms—
in fact, mainly European and Asian firms—it seems that the country
of origin of the firm might have an influence on ISO 14001 certifica-
tion.  This is confirmed by the fact that U.S. firms generally do not
benefit from the involvement of external stakeholders to help them
design their EMS.110  The totality of surveyed firms say neither their
“distributors” nor “community members” have been actively in-
volved in the design of their EMS; ninety-eight percent (98%) said
the same for their “customers/clients;” ninety-six percent (96%) for
their “shareholders;” eighty-nine percent (89%) for their “marketing/
public relations personnel;” eighty-three percent (83%) for their
“lawyers;” and ninety-three percent (93%) for their “regulatory offi-
cials.”111
On the contrary, most of the firms consider that it is the indi-
viduals within the company who are most substantially (“quite to
very”) involved in the design of the EMS:  with forty-six percent
(46%) citing the involvement of “corporate representatives;” fifty-
seven percent (57%) citing “employees;” sixty-one percent (61%)
citing “senior management;” and eighty-nine percent citing
“environmental managers.”112  Thus, the survey suggests that U.S.
firms are building on their own resources to put their ISO 14001 EMS
in place and do not rely on outside help.
D. ISO 14001 and Environmental Performance
As discussed above, one of the primary goals of the standard is
to improve environmental performance.113  Thus, we should ask
whether firms in our survey consider the improvement of environ-
mental performance as one of their primary goals in acquiring the
ISO 14001 certification.  Four variables were designed to represent
environmental performance: “improved regulatory compliance,”
“improved management of environmental impacts,” “reduced envi-
ronmental risk,” and “reduced pollution”.114  According to the survey,
a modest majority of managers considered these variables to be at
109. See id.
110. See supra Table 5.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
114. See supra Table 4.
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least “quite important” in their decision to become ISO 14001 certi-
fied:  fifty-one percent (51%) for “improved regulatory compliance;”
seventy-two percent (72%) for “improved management of environ-
mental impacts;” sixty-two percent (62%) for “reduced environ-
mental risk;” and sixty-two percent (62%) for “reduced pollution.”115
These figures indicate that managers believe the improvement of en-
vironmental performance is an important reason to seek certification.
However, it should be noted that the strongest reason to seek
certification in the context of “environmental performance” was
“improved management of environmental impacts,” which accounted
for seventy-two percent (72%).116  This confirms the point made ear-
lier in Section B of Part III that one of the weaknesses of the stan-
dard is its lack of specific performance indicators and common met-
rics for tracking and comparing environmental performance.117  In
addition, the survey supports our main finding that ISO 14001 does
not directly improve environmental performance but does influence
the management of environmental impacts.118
E. ISO 14001 and the Role of Stakeholders and Search for
Competitive Advantage
It is clear from the survey that, in the U.S. at least, whether or
not ISO 14001 is adopted is not related to stakeholders’ require-
ments.119  A vast majority of firms considered the concerns of various
stakeholders as largely unimportant in seeking certification:  sixty-
four percent (64%) of firms so found regarding “increased share-
holder value;” sixty-eight percent (68%) of firms regarding the moti-
vation of “customer requirement;” ninety percent (90%) regarding a
“buyer requirement;” and ninety-four percent (94%) regarding a
“lender requirement.”120  In general, very few U.S. companies at pres-
ent require that their suppliers be ISO 14001 certified.121  In fact, IBM
is one of the few that do require certification—which might explain
the high rate of certification in the electronics industry.122
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See supra notes 64-83 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
119. See supra Table 4.
120. See id.
121. See Kara Sissell, Autos and Electronics Drive Certification, 162 CHEMICAL WEEK,
April 5, 2000, at 14, 42-43.
122. See id.
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According to the survey results, ISO 14001 certification is better
used as a public demonstration of environmental stewardship.123
Sixty-six percent (66%) of the firms in our sample consider “public
demonstration of environmental stewardship” as an important reason
to get ISO 14001 certification.124  However, “communication with
community” and “marketing/advertising opportunity” are less impor-
tant for firms as incentives in seeking certification, accounting for
only forty percent (40%) and forty-three percent (43%), respec-
tively.125
According to the survey, one of the main incentives for applying
for ISO 14001 originates from the need to access markets where ISO
14001 is a requirement.126  The variables representing the potential to
gain a competitive advantage from the adoption of ISO 14001 are all
deemed important reasons by the majority of managers to seek certi-
fication:  “increased international trade opportunities” accounting for
fifty-one percent (51%); “increased competitive advantage” ac-
counting for sixty-two percent (62%); and “greater market share” ac-
counting for fifty-four percent (54%).127  Only “access to new mar-
kets” does not muster a majority, accounting for only forty-three
percent (43%).128  These results indicate that U.S. firms believe that
there is a positive link between the adoption of ISO 14001 certifica-
tion and the attainment of business advantages, including competitive
advantage.
In summary, our results of the survey of U.S. firms regarding
ISO 14001 certification show the following:
(1) In the U.S., firms that became certified are mostly multi-
nationals with experience in dealing with management
standards;
(2) U.S. certified firms believe that the U.S. institutional set-
up does not facilitate the adoption of ISO 14001 and
might even be a constraint to its implementation;
(3) There is neither a demand, nor involvement from U.S.
stakeholders to push firms to adopt the standard.  More
specifically, U.S. stakeholders generally are not contrib-
123. See supra Table 4.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
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uting to the implementation of the standard at the firm
level and are not requiring firms to obtain certification;
and
(4) Managers do believe that the adoption of the ISO 14001
standard will improve their environmental performance.
However, since the standard is not valued by U.S.
stakeholders, it is mainly used to demonstrate environ-
mental stewardship to the public and to increase trade
opportunities.
V.  NECESSARY ELEMENTS REQUIRED TO FACILITATE THE
ADOPTION OF ISO 14001 IN THE U.S.
Based on prior discussions, the following will be devoted to the
identification of various changes that would be required to favor the
adoption of ISO 14001 by U.S. firms.  Section A discusses the current
U.S. institutional and regulative barriers to the adoption of ISO
14001, and how these could be changed.  Section B discusses how the
fact that ISO 14001 is a non-performance standard could hamper the
adoption of ISO 14001 by U.S. firms, and how it could be modified.
A.  Institutional Barriers in the U.S. and Remedies Thereto
In a competitive market in which contract losses due to non-
compliance with applicable environmental regulations—or even
worse, a hefty legal settlement—could irreparably damage the pres-
tige and finances of a company, ISO 14001 can offer firms an organ-
ized approach to managing environmental issues.  As discussed in
Sections B and C of Part III above, using this approach, a firm can
cut environment-related costs and thereby increase profits in a vari-
ety of ways.129
However, as discussed in Sections A of Part III above, the proc-
ess of acquiring ISO 14001 certification might be costly if there is un-
certainty about regulatory agency commitment to the standard.130  An
EMS audit under ISO 14001 may reveal not only procedural defects,
but also environmental performance problems including non-
compliance with existing command-and-control regulations.131  If
firms are required to disclose this information to appropriate en-
forcement authorities as part of the certification process, and if these
129. See supra notes 64-83 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
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authorities do not commit to interpreting these audits in a positive
way, then there will be potential liability costs for certified compa-
nies.132  These additional costs are potentially a major obstacle to the
initiation of ISO 14001 certification for U.S. firms.133
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has moved halt-
ingly from a strict command-and-control approach toward more open
communication and flexible programs.134  The EPA is proposing more
innovative approaches and recognizes that industrial commitment
and advancement in the area of pollution prevention could properly
be considered when rendering decisions on prioritizing enforcement
goals, defining what penalties will be sought for specific actions, and
negotiating settlements.135  However, it is not clear to what extent the
adversarial culture between industry and regulatory agencies has ac-
tually tempered—or whether that is really possible—enough to effect
a positive shift towards the diffusion of ISO 14001 in the U.S.136  From
industry’s point of view, the few initiatives launched by the EPA that
have been developed to foster the development of ISO 14001 might
still appear inadequate.137
ISO 14001 stipulates that audit findings from internal or external
audits be documented in a detailed written audit report.138  In the U.S.
context, firms might fear that these audit reports would become the
new “smoking gun” of environmental litigation.139  Indeed, it is not
clear how firms would be able to protect the confidentiality of audit
reports and other documents solely through the attorney-client
132. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
134. See Mary McKiel, ISO 14001: Implications for US Environmental Programs, in OECD
ISO Document, supra note 10, at 57.
135. See Lally, supra note 9, at 519, 520.
136. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
137. See Rodgers, supra note 19, at 267-74.  However, recently, there have been positive
coordinated efforts by the EPA and state agencies, and public interest community (NGOs) to
facilitate the ISO 14001 certification in the U.S., such as the the Multi-State Working Group on
Environmental Management Systems (MSWG) which coordinates an array of pilot projects at
the state level. See generally, Robert D. Stephens, Multi State Working Group on Environ-
mental Management Systems” in OECD ISO Document, supra note 10, at 81-87.  One of the
MSWG’s primary purposes is to facilitate research efforts that examine EMSs and new regula-
tory innovations. See id. at 81-82.  The working group’s various projects and events are de-
signed to provide members and others with better information on ISO 14001, EMAS and other
EMS frameworks. See id. at 84.
On other initiatives linked to ISO 14001 at the U.S. federal and state level see generally
McKiel, supra note 134, at 60-62.
138. See ISO 14001 Standard, § 4.5.3, supra note 19.
139. See supra notes 60, 61 and accompanying text.
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privilege and the attorney work product doctrine, which are the two
traditional legal privileges that grant confidentiality.140  Past attempts
to protect the results of the ISO 14001 “Certification and Surveil-
lance Audits” conducted by an external auditing team under these
two privileges have not been successful.141  The attorney-client privi-
lege does not apply because the third-party audits would probably
not involve the consultation of an attorney for legal advice.142  In-
stead, an independent registrar evaluates the EMS in order to give an
opinion on the state of the EMS to the National Registration Board.
In that respect, using the terms of Hunt & Wilkins, third-party audits
would be considered as a “Management Audit” rather than a “Com-
pliance Audit,” and thus would not be protected by attorney-client
privilege.143
In fact, results of even an internal EMS audit could be kept con-
fidential under the attorney-client privilege only if the audit were
conducted under the supervision of an attorney.144  Thus, in order for
this privilege to be recognized in courts, the audit must be directed
and controlled by the attorney and the role of the attorney must be to
give legal advice.145  Furthermore, the work product doctrine only
protects information gathered in anticipation of litigation.  However,
“because…routine compliance or management system audits are not
prepared "in anticipation of litigation," industry only rarely will be
able to rely on the work product doctrine to prevent disclosure of
these audit results.”146  Thus, the information gathered in the external
audits would probably be discoverable in courts.
140. For a full discussion of the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine and
their applicability to environmental audits, see generally Terrell E. Hunt & Timothy A. Wil-
kins, Environmental Audits and Enforcement Policy, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 376-88
(1992).
141. See Rodgers, supra note 19, at 263 (noting that “given the availability of broad discov-
ery and FOIA requests in the United States, plaintiffs bringing private citizen suits or tort ac-
tions against an organization and/or its officers may be able to obtain information generated
and documented through environmental audits . . ..[E]ven if environmental audit reports are
controlled by counsel, they may not be considered privileged under attorney-client, work prod-
uct, or self-critical analysis doctrines . . . . Thus, if no statutory privilege applies in a particular
jurisdiction, environmental audit reports, and conceivably EPE documentation, may be subject
to discovery during private litigation.”).
142. See Hunt & Wilkins, supra note 140, at 381, 382.
143. For comparison on “Management Audits” and “Compliance Audits” see id. at 366,
367.
144. See id. at 383-89.
145. See id.
146. Hunt & Wilkins, supra note 140, at 385.
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However, a potential protection against self-incrimination
through an EMS audit may come about with the emergence of a
“self-evaluation privilege.”147  With such a privilege, liability derived
from audit reports would be limited from civil, criminal, or adminis-
trative court proceedings, provided that the company being audited
meets certain conditions of the EPA.148  Specifically, the EPA devel-
oped a document in 1995 called “Incentives for Self-Policing: Discov-
ery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations,” which
provides guidance to design a “self-evaluation privilege” regulation.149
However, by mid-1997, only 19 states had passed the self-evaluation
privilege into law.150  Since the privilege has been recently introduced,
it is not clear whether and to what extent the courts will recognize
it.151  These results underscore the importance as well as the com-
plexity of the legal implications of ISO 14001.152
Furthermore, as discussed in Section C of Part III, the cost of de-
signing and implementing an EMS might be high in an environment
where there is little industry experience to build upon and few con-
147. See generally Voluntary Environmental Self-Policing and Self-Disclosure Interim Pol-
icy Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,875, 16,878 (1995); Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Dis-
closure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (1995); Eric W. Orts &
Paula W. Murray, Environmental Disclosure and Evidentiary Privilege, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 1,
14-20 (noting that “[a]lthough the EPA again rejected the notion of an audit privilege, its 1995
policy statement offered new incentives for environmental auditing”); Hunt & Wilkins, supra
note 140, at 389-92 (discussing how the courts have dealt with “Critical Self-Analysis" privi-
lege).
148. See Orts & Murray, supra note 147, at 14.  However, it should be noted that such
privilege would be limited to legal proceedings brought by the EPA, and thus the audited com-
pany might still be liable against other non-EPA litigants.
149.  See 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (1995).  According to EPA’s document, “a company that dis-
covers a violation through routine environmental auditing or due diligence, the EPA promises
to eliminate gravity-based, punitive civil penalties....However, the following six conditions must
be met in order for a company to be eligible: (1) the company must promptly report the viola-
tion to the EPA; (2) the company must remediate the damage caused by the legal violation; (3)
the company must adopt preventative measures to avoid similar violations in the future; (4) the
violation may not be a "repeat" violation; (5) the company must "cooperate" with the EPA in
providing information; and (6) the violation must not cause "serious actual harm" or present
"an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health or the environment."” Orts &
Murray, supra note 147, at 14.
150. See Alexander Volokh, Carrots Over Sticks: the Case for Environmental Self-Audits, 29
WASHINGTON MONTHLY No. 6, June 1997, 28, at 29.
151. See Hunt & Wilkins, supra note 140, at 389-92.
152. See Orts & Murray, supra note 147, at 47, where they identify four incentives, or “car-
rots,” that would encourage the participation of firms in a voluntary environmental standard,
such as the 1SO 14001 in the United States: “(1) an evidentiary self-evaluative privilege [to
protect the subjective evaluations and remedial recommendations made in environmental
audits]; (2) significantly reduced civil penalties for self-reported legal violations; (3) leniency in
criminal prosecution; and (4) a transitional period of limited amnesty.”
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sulting companies to utilize.153  The experience of the firm in dealing
with management standards is also important.154  In that respect, the
time and cost for implementing ISO 14001 partly depends on:  1)
whether a site has a functioning ISO 9000 Quality Management Sys-
tem to build on;155 2) whether it has implemented responsible care
programs, such as programs for pollution prevention, community
awareness and emergency response and process safety programs;156
and, 3) if it has systems in place to maintain compliance with state
and federal regulations.
In light of these factors, the lack of adoption of ISO 14001 in the
U.S. can be explained by the institutional specificity of the American
context.  In contrast, the European context seems to provide a better
ground for the development of EMS standards.157  The European
Commission has been at the origin of the development of EMAS in
conjunction with industry.158  Cultural elements in Europe, such as
better relationships between regulatory agencies and industry, have
mitigated firms’ fears of transaction costs linked to the adoption of
the EMS certification.159  In Asia as well, regulatory agencies have ac-
tively pushed the development of ISO 14001.160  Unfortunately, the
quality of exchange that can be observed in both Europe and Asia
between industry and regulatory agencies does not exist in the U.S.
Thus, it is suggested here that the lack of cooperation between indus-
try and regulatory agencies in the U.S. most likely accounts for the
slow pace of adoption of ISO 14001.
In Europe and Asia, governments have adopted practical meas-
ures to facilitate the development of Environmental Management
153. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
155. See Fielding, supra note 78, at 4.
156. For discussion on how “Responsible Care” bares communality with ISO 14001 see su-
pra notes 13, 26, 77 and accompanying text.
157. Cf. supra Table 1.
158. See Orts, supra note 2, at 1290-92.
159. See generally id. at 1287-1313.
160. For literature on ISO 14001 and Asia, see generally Keikou Terui, ISO 14001 Imple-
mentation in Japan, in OECD ISO Document, supra note 10, at 67-71 (discussing how ISO
14001 has been received in Japan); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Environmental Management Systems
and Environmental Protection: Can ISO 14001 be Useful Within the Context of APEC? 6 J.
ENV’T. & DEV. 292, 310 (Sept. 1997); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Developing Countries, Regional
Organization, and the ISO 14001 Environmental Management Standard, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL.
L. Rev. 583, 599-601 (1997) (noting that ISO 14001 in Asian developing countries is motivated
by the government’s concerns on trade and export).
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Standards.161  For example, “local German authorities have begun to
ease administrative enforcement requirements on EMAS certified
sites.”162  As the ISO Background Paper suggests, such policy could
provide an indirect benefit to the regulatory agencies themselves, in
that “it frees control resources and enables the authorities to concen-
trate efforts on non-EMAS certified sites.”163  In Asia, central gov-
ernments from various countries have promoted the ISO 14001 certi-
fication more directly:  1) “fundin[g] ISO 14000 support programmes
already in place;”164 and/or 2) “offer[ing] technical or financial assis-
tance to companies taking up ISO 14000.”165
In addition to regulatory agencies from central governments,
some “local government administrations are also taking a number of
measures to promote the use of ISO 14001.”166  For example, Kana-
gawa Prefectural government in Japan, issued an “Ordinance on
Conservation of Living Environment,” which allows ISO 14001 certi-
fied companies “to be exempted from frequent inspections and re-
porting requirements.”167  Moreover, to facilitate the certification
process, “some local governments [in Japan] have acquired registra-
tion themselves.”168
Thus, this piece suggests that to facilitate U.S. firms’ adoption of
ISO 14001 certification, applicable regulatory agencies such as the
EPA or state and local environmental agencies should promulgate
regulations limiting the liability of ISO applicant firms’ when viola-
tions of applicable regulations are revealed or disclosed through the
certification or documentation process required under ISO 14001.
Additionally, applicable government agencies, including federal,
state and local agencies, could actively promote ISO 14001 certifica-
tion by initiating practical measures, such as 1) easing administrative
enforcement requirements on ISO 14001 certified sites; 2) providing
technical and/or financial assistance to already certified firms or firms
161. See Background Paper: Review of the Development of International Environmental
Management Systems [hereinafter “ISO Background Paper”], in OECD ISO Document, supra
note 10, at 15, 32-34.
162. Id. at 32.
163. Id.
164. According to the ISO Background Paper, “[t]hese countries include: Japan, China,
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Sri
Lanka.” Id.
165. Id. (noting that “Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Korea, Japan and China” provide such
assitance).
166. Id.
167. Id.  See also Terui, supra note 160, at 71.
168. See Terui, supra note 160, at 70-71.
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adopting ISO 14001 certification; and, 3) providing exemptions to
certified firms’ company sites from frequent inspections and report-
ing requirements.
B.  Non-Performance Standards as Barriers, and Remedies Thereto
As discussed in Section B of Part III above, one explanation of
the difficulty in promulgating ISO 14001 resides in its incompleteness
in dealing with the measurement of environmental performance.169  In
order to provide firms with a potential competitive advantage, the
standard should clearly define a procedure for the assessment of en-
vironmental performance.170  Although commitment to improved en-
vironmental performance and compliance with existing command-
and-control regulations are prerequisites to ISO 14001 certification,
the standard does not require release of any real measure of envi-
ronmental performance.171  Thus, it is difficult for stakeholders to as-
sess the value of such a standard.  The European environmental
management standard EMAS partly deals with this problem by re-
quiring preparation and public dissemination of “environmental
statements.”172  Environmental statements must accurately summarize
the findings and conclusions of the more detailed internal audits,173
and a statement for each site must “be designed for the public and
written in a concise,” non-technical form.174  Public disclosure of envi-
ronmental performance is at the heart of the EMAS.175  Most EMAS
certified companies in Europe are also ISO 14001 certified.176  This
might explain why stakeholders in Europe are more receptive to en-
vironmental management standards than in the U.S.177  Stakeholders
169. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
171. See ISO 14001 Standard, § 4.5.1, supra note 19.  See also supra notes 68-70 and accom-
panying text.
172. See Council Regulation 1836/93, art. 5, 1993 O.J. (L 168) 1, 4, in OECD ISO Docu-
ment, supra note 10, at 107.
173. See id., art. 5.3.
174. See id., art. 5.2.
175. Article 2.2 of the Council Regulation states that “[t]he objective of the scheme shall be
to promote continuous improvements in the environmental performance of industrial activities
by:…(c) the provision of information of environmental performance to the public.” See id. at
105.
176. Cf. Lally, supra note 9, at 523 (noting that “EU site registration to ISO 14001 may si-
multaneously constitute EMAS participation”).
177. See generally, Roht-Arriaza, supra note 9, at 504 (noting that “[w]hile regulatory com-
pliance and potential liability drive the move towards environmental management and auditing
standards in the U.S., demonstrating to the public that a company is “green” and taking its en-
vironmental responsibilities seriously is a primary motivation for establishing environmental
DELMAS_FINAL_POSTPP.DOC 04/17/01  1:28 PM
36 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 11: 1
in Europe have tangible information on the environmental perform-
ance of certified companies.178  Furthermore, since ISO 14001 is a
process standard and is not linked to any eco-labeling standard, it
does not send a clear signal to customers regarding a firm’s environ-
mental improvements.
In addition, as the standard does not include any specification
regarding life cycle assessment,179 it does not encourage firms to ac-
tively research innovative and lucrative solutions to environmentally
sensitive components of the production process.  Life Cycle Assess-
ment is an analysis that covers every stage and every significant envi-
ronmental impact of a product from the extraction and use of raw
materials to the eventual disposal of the components of the product
and their decomposition back to the elements.180  Moreover, ISO
14001 does not suggest any Design for the Environment practices
(“DfE”).181  This means that the implementation of ISO 14001 does
not require the firm to re-think its links with suppliers and distribu-
tors, nor does it push the firm to re-design its products to reduce their
environmental impacts.  It is therefore likely that ISO 14001 certifica-
tion will not lead to innovative changes in production processes.
Assuming that regulatory agencies would be more inclined to
promote a standard that increases the competitiveness of the indus-
try, it is submitted here that that a more comprehensive standard is
required for ISO 14001 to be accepted on an international scale.
Regulatory agencies would then compete for the adoption of a stan-
dard that provides a competitive advantage to their industry.182
auditing standards in Europe”); Stenzel, supra note 9, at 271 (noting that in Germany and the
Netherlands, consumers prefer “commodities manufactured with environmental consideration
and priced higher than those without such consideration”).
178. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 9, at 507.  See also Ronald Begley, Is ISO 14000 Worth
It? 17 J. BUS. STRATEGY 1754-55 (1996).
179. On Life Cycle Assessment, see generally Richard Welford, Life Cycle Assessment, in
CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: SYSTEMS AND STRATEGIES, supra note 11, at
138-147.
180. See id.  It should be noted that ISO 14040 to 14043 on Life Cycle Assessment are not
yet subject to certification.
181. The idea behind DfE is to ensure that all-relevant and ascertainable environmental
considerations and constraints are integrated into a firm’s product realization (design process).
See generally Braden Allenby, Integrating Environment and Technology: Design For Environ-
ment in ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 245, at 247 (Michael V. Russo et. al., 1999).  The
goal is to achieve environmentally preferable manufacturing processes and products while
maintaining desirable product price/performance characteristics. See id. at 247.
182. See Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Market Access, Competitiveness, and Har-
monization: Environmental Protection in Regional Trade Agreements, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 265, 293 (noting that ISO 14001 is one form of procedural harmonization, but unlike
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Thus, this paper recommends that to facilitate U.S. firms’ adop-
tion of ISO 14001 certification, applicable government agencies and
relevant industry actors should require EMSs to clearly define a pro-
cedure to assess environmental performance.  Such a procedure
would be similar to that of EMAS, which requires preparation and
public dissemination of environmental statements designed for the
public and written in a concise, non-technical form.
VI.  CONCLUSION
Spearheaded by the International Organization for Standardiza-
tion, with the participation of 50 of its 111 member nations, ISO
14001 is a voluntary environmental management and procedural
standard.  Since ISO 14001 is voluntary, it appears that firms seek
certification when the potential transaction costs of acquiring the cer-
tification are offset by the advantages the certification will ultimately
provide to the firm.  This paper has analyzed how a specific institu-
tional context can impact the cost of implementing such an EMS
standard at the firm level.  It has also described the benefits that
adoption of the standard provides firms with respect to competitive
advantage.
Uncertainty of regulatory behavior toward firms seeking ISO
14001 certification impacts the level of transaction costs between the
firm and the certification body, because the transaction demands a
high level of asset specificity.  Furthermore, since the standard does
not present tangible results of the actual improvement of environ-
mental performance to a firm’s stakeholders, it becomes vital that all
stakeholders believe in the underlying benefits of the ISO 14001
standardization and promote them.  If presented with such a mandate
from stakeholders, firms are more likely to transform certification
into a potential competitive advantage.
The survey of U.S. certified firms supported our propositions.
Firms seemed to perceive that American regulatory institutions do
not provide enough regulatory flexibility to allow the smooth devel-
opment of ISO 14001.  Stakeholder pressures to push the adoption of
the standard were still weak.  The data indicated that firms are using
EMAS, only focuses on procedure and not substance).  Esty & Geradin further discuss the
“disadvantage of relying on environmental systems,” such as the ISO 14001:  “there may be
little convergence in the substantive requirements that are imposed from jurisdiction to juris-
diction.  As a result, wide variations in environmental compliance costs may persist and com-
petitiveness tensions may endure.  A harmonized approach to environmental systems would
reduce the risk of a race toward the bottom.” Id.
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the certification more to increase trade opportunities than to obtain a
competitive advantage within their own market.  Ultimately, in the
United States it was not clear whether the competitive advantage
gained from the adoption of the ISO 14001 standard would offset its
potential associated transaction costs.
This paper suggests that the institutional environment should
credibly commit to promoting the standard by protecting firms from
the subjective evaluations and remedial recommendations made in an
environmental audit.  The standard should also be improved by re-
questing a public disclosure of their environmental performance.
This would allow stakeholders to compare firms’ performance and to
drive the demand for certification.
The United States is an interesting example, because the ques-
tion still remains whether obtaining ISO 14001 certification offers
value to companies.  The problem of the implementation of ISO
14001 might be even more critical in developing countries where the
resources to promote the standard are often less available.  Further
research could productively address the issue of the diffusion of ISO
14001 even more comprehensively and in the international sphere.
